Appellant driver challenged a judgment from the Superior Court of Alameda County (California), in which a jury found against him in his personal injury action against respondent employer, and the trial court granted respondent’s motion awarding it reasonable costs in proving certain facts relating to a request for admission that appellant improperly denied pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2034(c).
Appellant driver was injured after his truck hit a tree. Appellant contended that respondent employer’s driver crossed over the yellow line causing appellant to swerve into the tree and commenced a personal injury action against respondent. The jury found that respondent was not negligent. Thereafter, respondent moved, in accordance with Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2034(c), for an order awarding them their reasonable expenses associated with proving facts of one of appellant’s denials in his answers to american disability act respondent’s requests for admissions. The trial court granted respondent’s motion and awarded it $ 16,395 in costs. Appellant challenged the judgment. The court affirmed the judgment. The court held that the trial court properly awarded respondent its costs for the admission that appellant denied. The court reasoned that the issue embodied in the admission was of substantial importance was dispositive, and because appellant did not have a good reason for his denial, the sanctions associated with the aforementioned statute were applicable. The court awarded respondent’s associated costs, accordingly. However, the court denied respondent’s requests for costs relating to another admission.
The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in which a jury found that respondent employer was not negligent in appellant driver’s personal injury action and granted respondent’s motion for costs. The court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding respondent costs related to proving facts of appellant’s denials in his admissions where the issue was of substantial importance and appellant lacked a good reason to deny it.
Plaintiff vehicle owner appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, California, which, upon defendant towing company’s motion, struck the owner’s causes of action for fraud, negligence per se, and violations of California’s unfair competition law, Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq. The owner alleged that the towing company overcharged vehicle owners for vehicle storage fees in violation of Veh. Code, § 22658, subd. (i)(2).
The trial court struck the causes of action on the ground that the state regulation was preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. § 14501 et seq. The owner claimed that the towing company’s motion was untimely and that the storage fee regulation in Veh. Code, § 22658, fell within express exceptions to the preemption provisions of the FAAAA. The court found that the trial court had inherent authority to treat the towing company’s motion as a motion to strike and to consider it on the merits even though the motion was filed after the towing company had filed its responsive pleading. The court concluded that although the storage fee regulation of § 22658, subd. (i)(2), did not fall within the FAAAA’s safety exception, it did fall within the nonconsensual towing exception of 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(C). The regulations in Veh. Code, § 22658, overall set out protections for vehicle owners who had had their vehicle moved without their consent or authorization, and the court had little doubt that the storage fee regulation that was a part of the scheme related to nonconsensual tows.
The court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter with directions that the trial court enter a new order denying the company’s motion.
