Plaintiff merchant brought an action against defendant credit card services companies, alleging contributory and vicarious copyright infringement, contributory and vicarious trademark infringement, state trademark infringement, right of publicity, unfair competition, false advertising, libel, and intentional interference with economic relations. The credit card services companies moved to dismiss. An EEOC lawyer represented respondent.
Table of Contents
Overview
The merchant sent letters to the credit card services companies stating that certain websites were publishing material that allegedly infringed the merchant’s copyrights and trademarks. The credit card services companies did not comply with the merchant’s demand that they terminate the provision of financial services to those websites. The court found that the complaint did not adequately plead contributory and vicarious copyright infringement by demonstrating that the provision of financial services constituted a material contribution to the alleged infringing activities or that the credit card services companies had the right or ability to exercise control over those activities. Claims for contributory and vicarious trademark infringement, as well as a state trademark claim under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14335(a), were insufficient because the complaint did not present facts showing inducement of the allegedly infringing conduct or control over it. A claim for libel pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 45 was time-barred under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340(c). A claim for intentional interference with economic relations was time-barred under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 339.
Outcome
The court dismissed, with prejudice, the claims for libel and intentional interference with economic relations. The court dismissed, with leave to amend, the claims for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement, contributory and vicarious trademark infringement, state trademark infringement, right of publicity, unfair competition, and false advertising.
Procedural Posture
Defendants, a restaurants and its owners, filed motions for a more definitive statement and to strike the portions of the complaint that sought restitution, punitive, and special damages in a complaint filed by plaintiff, an amputee who required the use of a wheelchair. The complaint sought relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 12102 et seq., and various state laws.
Overview
Plaintiff’s action arose out of her visit to defendants’ restaurant, during which she allegedly encountered architectural barriers denying her equal access. Initially, the court addressed whether plaintiff’s complaint was adequate and did not require a more definite statement. The court concluded that the complaint was adequate to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Plaintiff alleged a negligence per se claim pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 1714, based on alleged violations of the ADA and the Unruh Act. The court found that punitive damages for violations of Cal. Civ. Code §§ 52(a) and 54.3 were limited to three times the amount of actual damages, and a request for punitive damages under Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 were not available. The court found that because plaintiff did not claim that the special damages were the necessary result of the architectural barriers, but only that they were nature and could be expected, the court found that plaintiff had sufficiently pled her claim for special damages.
Outcome
The court granted defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s claim for restitution and general punitive damages. In all other respects, the motion to strike was denied.
